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Vol. XX FEBRUARY, 1935 No. 2
MISSOURI LAW ON PERFORMANCE OF ORAL
CONTRACTS AS A METHOD OF VALIDATION
WHEN STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS INVOKED
BY TYRRELL WILLIAMS
CLASSES OF CONTRACTS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
By the Statute of Frauds in this article is meant those portions
of the Revised Statutes of Missouri which derive directly from
the fourth section and the seventeenth section of the original
English Statute of Frauds, 29 Charles II, c. 3 (1677). Revised
Statutes of Missouri, 1929, Sec. 2967 (Mo. St. Anno., Sec. 2967,
p. 1835) contains all the essential provisions of the fourth sec-
tion of the English statute, and also two additional provisions,
one relating to leases for more than one year, and one relating
to an agent's authority to sell real estate. No further reference
will be made to these additional provisions. Revised Statutes of
Missouri, 1929, Sec. 2968 (Mo. St. Anno., Sec. 2968, p. 1835)
covers the essential provisions of the seventeenth section of the
original English statute, except that "thirty dollars" is substi-
tuted for "ten pounds sterling."
By grouping together these two sections of the original English
Statute of Frauds, as re-enacted in Missouri, we find that the
legislative modification of the common law was intended to oper-
ate on six classes of contracts. These six classes are:
Class I. Contracts by an executor or an administrator to an-
swer out of his own funds for a continuing debt of the estate.
Class II. Contracts by a guarantor with a creditor to answer
out of his own funds for a continuing debt of the principal
debtor.
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Class III. Contracts in consideration of marriage.
Class IV. Contracts for the sale of an interest in land.
Class V. Contracts not to be performed within one year.
Class VI. Contracts for the sale of goods, wares, and mer-
chandise for the price of thirty dollars or more.
All the contracts in these six classes are binding under the
Statute of Frauds if evidenced by a signed note or memorandum.
The kind of note or memorandum that will satisfy the Statute
of Frauds in one class will ordinarily satisfy that statute in all
the other classes. With reference to satisfying the Statute of
Frauds by note or memorandum, generalized statements of law
are common and useful. No further reference will be made in
this article to the method of satisfying the Statute of Frauds by
a note or memorandum.
SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE
If an oral contract apparently falls within one or another of
these six classes, and is performed, in whole or in part, by both
parties or by one party, what are the legal rights of the parties
under the Missouri Statute of Frauds? That is the question now
to be considered. Really there are six questions, because the
Statute of Frauds applies to six separate and distinctive classes
of contracts, and the decisions show that what is true of one
class, with reference to performance, is not necessarily true of
another class. As to contracts in the sixth class, as above speci-
fied, the Statute of Frauds itself prescribes performance by
buyer, in whole or in part, as one method of making the contract
binding, even if oral.
GENERALIZED AND MISLEADING DICTA
Unfortunately, many lawyers and judges have been disposed
to forget that there are varying classes of contracts specified un-
der the Statute of Frauds, and when correctly applying a prin-
ciple apposite to the particular type of contract under considera-
tion, often have used broad, general language as if the principle
were applicable to all classes of contracts described in the Statute
of Frauds.
Johnson v. Reading (1889) 36 Mo. App. 306 is a valuable case
involving a contract within Class V, as above set forth. Undoubt-
edly the case is correctly decided when judged by modern Mis-
souri law, by the weight of American authority, and by the Amer-
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ican Law Institute, Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 198. Unfortu-
nately, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, when rendering the cor-
rect decision, in its official opinion formulated this dictum: "It
is fairly deducible from all cases decided in this state touching
contracts falling within the various sections of the Statute of
Frauds, that where the contract has been fully performed on one
side, and the other party had the benefit of such performance,
recovery may be had even upon the contract itself." Of course,
this is not true of a guaranty contract, as described in Class II
above. Only seven months after the Johnson case was decided,
the same appellate court decided an oral guaranty case. A brew-
ing corporation, bound in writing to a lessor as guarantor of a
lessee, requested the lessor to release the lessee and take another
person as his substitute, and orally promised to guarantee pay-
ment of rent by the second lessee. The oral guarantor's offer was
accepted, and the contract was performed by the lessor. When
sued on the oral guaranty, the brewing company relied on the
Statute of Frauds, and won. The principle of full performance
on one side, properly adopted as a rule of decision in the Johnson
case, where the contract was within Class V, as above set forth,
was utterly beside the issues in the subsequent case involving a
contract within Class II. The case just referred to is Koenig v.
Miller Brothers Brewing Co. (1889) 38 Mo. App. 182. Even the
attorney for the plaintiff (appellant) did not advance the rule of
full performance. His chief effort was to argue that the con-
tract was not a guaranty at all. To a student in a law school,
the decision in the Koenig case would seem to be at variance with
the generalized and dogmatic dictum in the Johnson case. A thor-
ough study of the two cases from the same court in the same
year, and the earlier authorities cited in the two cases, is a valu-
able exercise to teach an important lesson, namely, that in law,
human experience is more important than logic.
In the official edition of Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1929, on
page 878, in notes to the Statute of Frauds, appears this com-
ment: "Estoppel.-After performance of contract within the
statute by one party, other cannot plead statute as bar. Phelps
v. McCaw, 210 Mo. App. 514, 240 S. W. 845." The opinion in
the case cited contains a generalized dictum that amply justifies
the annotator's comment. But the case merely decided that an
oral contract for the sale of land when partly performed by the
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vendor will create against him an equitable estoppel to prevent
his pleading the Statute of Frauds.
In Missouri Statutes Annotated, in notes to Sec. 2967, p. 1837,
appears the following: "A parol contract completely performed
by one of the parties is not within statute. Self v. Cordell, 45 Mo.
345; Mitchell v. Branham, 104 Mo. App. 480; 79 S. W. 739;
Marks v. Davis, 72 Mo. App. 557; Bless v. Jenkins, 31 S. W. 938,
129 Mo. 647; Hubbard v. K. C. Stained Glass Works, 188 Mo. 18,
86 S. W. 82." A reading of this proposition would suggest that
it applies to all classes of the Statute of Frauds. A reading of
the cases referred to reveals that every case has to do with a con-
tract within or alleged to be within Class V.
In Jones v. Jones (1933) 333 Mo. 478, 63 S. W. (2nd) 146,
the court said: "Full or even part performance generally takes
an oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds." The suit was by
vendee for specific performance of an oral contract to sell land
after full performance by the equitable vendee, who agreed to
render services as consideration for the transfer of the land, and
had done so. Plaintiff won the suit. When the writer of the
court's opinion used the language quoted he probably was think-
ing only of cases within Class IV of the Statute of Frauds.
CONTRACTS FULLY PERFORMED ON BOTH SIDES
In legal thinking, a simple contract is regarded as an unper-
formed promise supported either (1) by an executed considera-
tion, or (2) by a return promise which is unperformed. A
bilateral agreement, after full performance on both sides, ceases
to be a contract in the strict legal sense although as a matter of
convenience the term "contract" is often applied to mutual prom-
ises even after full performance on both sides. Apart from con-
stitutional law, criminal illegality, equitable grounds for rescis-
sion or reformation, and legal incapacity of parties, courts are
not concerned with so-called contracts after they have been fully
performed on both sides. The Statute of Frauds and thousands
of judicial opinions construing that statute, are all in line as to
the true nature of a contract. Since the Statute of Frauds applies
to contracts, and since mutual promises fully performed on both
sides are not contracts it is proper to say that an oral contract
originally within the statute, and fully performed on both sides,
cannot be disturbed simply because of the absence of a writing.
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This is universal American and English law. Williston on Con-
tracts, Sec. 528; Page on Contracts (2nd Ed.), Sec. 1363; Ameri-
can Law Institute, Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 219.
Missouri law reports contain many cases illustrating this prin-
ciple. In Welch v. Mann (1906) 193 Mo. 304, 92 S. W. 98, it
appeared that an oral antenuptial contract by a solvent man to
convey property to his prospective wife in consideration of mar-
riage was "obnoxious to the Statute of Frauds," but when car-
ried into effect after marriage could not then be set aside by
subsequent creditors, because the statute does not apply to a con-
tract fully performed on both sides. In Maupin, v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry. Co. (1902) 171 Mo. 187, 71 S. W. 334, there was an
oral contract for an easement actually allowed in consideration
of the actual building of a railroad along the easement. The
transaction was held to be binding, the court saying: "When a
contract which the law requires to be proven by writing has been
clearly shown by oral testimony to have been made and to have
been fully performed, the execution takes it out of the operation
of the Statute of Frauds." Other cases holding that oral con-
tracts are binding in spite of the Statute of Frauds when fully
performed on both sides are: Denny v. Brown (Mo. Sup. 1917)
193 S. W. 552, sale and delivery of chattels in connection with
settlement of accounts between partners; Mueller v. Wiebracht
(1871) 47 Mo. 468, contract of guaranty after payments made
by guarantor; McBride Realty Co. v. Grace (1928) 223 Mo. App.
588, 15 S. W. (2nd) 957, contract affecting land held binding on
subsequent owner; Corda v. Connolly (Mo. App. 1924) 261 S. W.
729, executed contract creating a partnership; Poplin v. Brown
(1918) 200 Mo. App. 255, 205 S. W. 411, land traded for auto-
mobile; Bauer v. Weber Implement Co. (1910) 148 Mo. App.
652, 129 S. W. 59, land traded for machinery.
ORAL CONTRACTS WITHIN CLASS I
An oral secondary promise of an executor or administrator to
answer out of his own funds for a continuing debt of the de-
cedent's estate is not enforceable as against the plea of the stat-
ute, even if the promisee has fully performed his part of the
contract.
In Bambrick v. Bambrick (1900) 157 Mo. 423, 58 S. W. 8, the
defendant (an administratrix) may have orally promised to pay
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out of her own funds a debt of the estate in consideration of a
delay in presenting plaintiff's claim against the estate, and plain-
tiff relied on full performance on his part. The defendant relied
on the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff's attorney in his brief stated
this proposition: "The entire performance of a parol contract by
one party takes the promise of the other out of the operation of
the statute," and cited Self v. Cordell (1870) 45 Mo. 345; toyle
v. Bus& (1883) 14 Mo. App. 408; Sugget's Admr. v. Cason's
Admr. (1858) 26 Mo. 221; Simmons v. Headlee (1887) 94 Mo.
482. The opinions in these cases seem to justify the broad dictum
of the attorney, but in not one of the cases was it decided that
the oral secondary promise of an administrator, even if sup-
ported by an executed consideration on the other side, would
make the administrator personally liable. In the Bambrick case
the court decided against personal liability of the administratrix.
Earlier Missouri cases were not reviewed. The decision was
based directly upon the language of the Statute of Frauds with
reference to actions brought against executors and administra-
tors to answer personally for their special promises. The court
said: "If the statute just recited does not apply to a contract
like this, then no case for its enforcement can ever be found."1
In the following cases the principle underlying this portion of
the Statute of Frauds was recognized and expounded but held
not to apply because of the facts: Gabbert v. Evans (1914) 184
Mo. App. 283, 166 S. W. 635, original and not secondary promise;
Hedden v. Schneblin (1907) 126 Mo. App. 478, 104 S. W. 887,
original and not secondary promise. General American law is in
accord. Page on Contracts (2nd Ed.) Sec. 215.
ORAL CONTRACTS WITHIN CLASS II
An oral promise by any person, other than the principal debtor,
to a creditor, to answer for the principal debtor's continuing debt
is not binding under the Statute of Frauds, even if the creditor
has fully performed his part of the contract of guaranty in ex-
I If plaintiff could have proved what he alleged, namely, a contract to
release the estate and full performance on his part, the defendant would
have been bound on a new and original oral contract of novation not within
the statute. The statute applies only when the estate remains liable. The
same principle takes many alleged contracts of guaranty out of the statute.
Beall v. Board of Trade of Kansas City (1912) 164 Mo. App. 186, 148 S. W.
386; Williston on Contracts, Sec. 477; Page on Contracts (2nd Ed.) Sec.
1244.
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press reliance on the oral promise of the secondary promisor.2
In Waggoner v. Davidson (1915) 189 Mo. App. 345, 175 S. W.
232, defendant orally promised plaintiff to pay a principal
debtor's debt to plaintiff if plaintiff would refrain from bringing
an ancillary attachment suit against the principal debtor. In
reliance on this oral promise the plaintiff refrained from bring-
ing an attachment suit against the principal debtor. Defendant
never paid the principal debtor's debt. Suit was brought by the
creditor, whose attorney in his brief advanced this proposition:
"Complete performance of contract by one contracting party
forecloses his adversary from interposing the Statute of Frauds
as his defense." In support of this proposition the following
cases were cited: Bless v. Jenkins (1895) 129 Mo. 647, 31 S. W.
938; Hedden v. Schneblin (1907) 126 Mo. App. 478, 104 S. W.
887; Chenoweth v. Pao. Exp. Co. (1902) 93 Mo. App. 185. These
cases contain dicta which seem to justify the lawyer's proposi-
tion, but in not one of the cases was it decided that the oral
secondary promise of a guarantor made to a creditor is binding
even if the creditor fully performs in reliance on the guarantor's
promise. The Hedden case and the Chenoweth case involved
promises not to be performed in less than a year. The Bless case
involved an oral promise by an alleged guarantor made to the
debtor and not to the creditor, a factual situation not covered by
the Statute of Frauds at all.
Swarens v. Pfnisel (1930) 324 Mo. 1245, 26 S. W. (2nd) 951,
is a useful case reviewing many earlier cases. Plaintiff, a physi-
cian, before treating a patient professionally, received an oral
offer of guaranty from B and then treated the patient, who did
not pay. After full performance by plaintiff defendant was sued
and won because his oral promise was within Class II. Here the
debt was not in existence at the time of the offer of guaranty and
the consideration was the subsequent professional treatment of
the patient, who was primarily liable. In the Waggoner case,
above, the principal debt was in existence before the guarantor's
oral contract with a new consideration came into existence.- Gen-
2 As a matter of convenience, no distinction is here made between guar-
anty and suretyship.
a Although Missouri and other American courts have been hardboiled in
resisting the full-performance-on-one-side theory as a mitigating principle
when applied to Class II, nevertheless, the hunch for justice (in some but
not all states) has brought into existence another and effective rationaliza-
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eral American law is in accord. Williston on Contracts, Sec. 461
and 462; Page on Contracts (2nd Ed.) Sec. 1366 and 1394;
American. Law Institute, Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 180, Illus-
tration 5.
ORAL CONTRACTS WITHIN CLASS III
Can an oral contract to confer or relinquish property rights
in consideration of marriage, and nothing but marriage, be en-
forced as against the plea of the Statute of Frauds if the promisee
has fully performed by getting married?
In Missouri the answer is no-except possibly in a case reveal-
ing strong evidence of a scheme to defraud by the oral promisor.
In Hafner v. Miller (1923) 299 Mo. 214, 252 S. W. 722, there was
an alleged antenuptial contract whereby a man orally promised
to give up some of his rights as a husband to the woman's prop-
erty, but after marriage and the woman's death, the oral con-
tract was inadmissible as evidence because of the Statute of
Frauds. This was the express holding. The court said: "If the
Statute of Frauds can be ignored and disregarded on such testi-
mony, as that relied on in this case, it should be abolished as
being without benefit in the practical administration of the law."
As to the possibility of enforcing the oral contract in case of an
tion for relaxing the statutory requirements as to Class II. This is called
the main purpose rule. If the main purpose of the alleged guarantor's oral
promise is for his own pecuniary advantage, he is bound in spite of the
statute, even if the principal debtor is not discharged. Missouri, after fifty
years of vacillation, finally adopted the main purpose rule when Wahl v.
Cunningham (1928) 320 Mo. 57, 6 S. W. (2nd) 576, 67 A. L. R. 489, was
decided by the court en banc. This case overruled or weakened many earlier
and widely cited cases, especially Gansey v. Orr (1903) 173 Mo. 532, 73
S. W. 477; Hurt v. Ford (1898) 142 Mo. 283, 44 S. W. 228, 41 L. R. A. 823;
Bissig v. Britton (1875) 59 Mo. 204, 21 Am. Rep. 379. The American Law
Institute is in accord with Missouri on this important question. Restate-
ment, Contracts, See. 184. Some influential states have rejected the main
purpose rule and New York is one of them. Richardson Press v. Albright
(1918) 224 N. Y. 497, 121 N. E. 362. The main purpose rule involves a
question of local jurisdiction to be considered separately for each state in
the union. See Simpkins, The Main Purpose Rule and the Statute of Frauds
as Applied to Promises to Answer for the Pre-existing Debt of Another,
17 St. Louis L. Rev. 348; also Williston on Contracts, Sec. 472; Page on
Contracts (2nd Ed.) Sec. 1224. This main purpose rule helps to solve the
embarrassing problems that arise when there is an oral promise by No. 1
to indemnify No. 2, who is a guarantor, surety or bondsman, in writing for
No. 3, who is principal debtor, to No. 4, who is principal creditor. Suppose
No. 4 is the state and No. 3 is an accused petty criminal and No. 2 is a
bondsman and No. 1 is No. 3's employer and No. 3's services are essential
to No. l's business. The main purpose of the oral contract to indemnify is
probably to benefit the promisor-a question of fact. See Quackenboss v.
Harbaugh (1923) 298 Mo. 240, 249 S. W. 940.
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attempt 'to defraud there are well considered dicta indicating an
affirmative answer in the Hafner case and also in Nowack v.
Berger (1895) 133 Mo. 24, 34 S. W. 489, 31 L. R. A. 810, 54 Am.
St. Rep. 663. Apparently, there are no clear-cut decisions in
Missouri on this point of fraud.
All states apply the statute literally to Class III in the absence
of fraud. Many states show a disposition to enforce the oral con-
tract in equity to prevent fraud, although the doctrine seems
largely to be based on dicta and analogy to land-sale contracts
rather than on express decisions. Some states reject absolutely
the exception as to fraud. Likewise, the American Law Institute
rejects the exception as to fraud. Restatement, Contracts, Sec.
192. For general American law see Williston, Sec. 486 and 533;
Page on Contracts (2nd Ed.), Sec. 1250.
If the oral promise to confer advantages is in consideration of
marriage and also some additional consideration, which addi-
tional consideration is in no way obnoxious to the Statute of
Frauds, can the oral promise be enforced as against the Statute
of Frauds if marriage and the additional consideration have both
been performed?
The American Law Institute has answered this question in the
negative. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 192. In the Nowack case,
cited third paragraph above, a man orally promised a woman
who had an illegitimate minor son that if she would marry him
and turn over to him the custody of her minor son, the man
would will property to his step-son as to his natural children.
After breach by and death of promisor, the step-son brought suit
for specific performance and recovered in spite of the Statute of
Frauds. In a careful opinion reviewing many English and Amer-
ican authorities the court seems to indicate that the answer to
the question last above stated should be in the affirmative and
also that the equitable principles pertinent to land-sale contracts
to prevent fraud should be applied. It may be observed that the
result of this case would be the same if the American Law Insti-
tute's formulations should be accepted as law. The American
Law Institute differentiates between a promise made in consider-
ation of marriage and a promise made in contemplation of mar-
riage. In the Nowack case the essential contract was an oral
promise to will property in consideration of turning over the
custody of a minor. This contract was made in contemplation of
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marriage but not in consideration of marriage. The Statute of
Frauds does not inhibit oral contracts in consideration of trans-
ferring the custody of minor children unless possibly the contract
is within Class V.
ORAL CONTRACTS WITHIN CLASS IV
In equity an oral land-sale contract may be enforced against a
defaulting promisor even if the latter invokes the Statute of
Frauds, provided, there has been sufficient part performance
under the oral contract to convince the chancellor that fraud will
result from a literal application of the statute.
The Missouri theory of part performance as an equitable sub-
stitute for the Statute of Frauds was presented in the early case
of Chambers v. Lecompte (1845) 9 Mo. 575, as follows: "It is
now settled that payment of money is not part performance, be-
cause it may be repaid, and then the parties will be just as they
were before, especially if repaid with interest. The principle
upon which part performance takes a case out of the statute, is
that it would otherwise make the statute a means of practising
a fraud; and therefore nothing is now considered as a part per-
formance which does not put the party into a situation which is
a fraud upon him, unless the agreement is performed. The ordi-
nary illustration of the principle is the case of a vendee by a
parol agreement put in possession. If the agreement be not valid
in law or equity, he is a trespasser and liable to an action. As a
matter of defense, it is held, that he can, under these circum-
stances, show the parol agreement by which he acquired posses-
sion, and the unwritten agreement being admissible for this pur-
pose is admissible throughout. The case is still stronger where
the vendee has not only taken possession, but expended money
in valuable or permanent improvements."
An oral contract followed by a mere payment of money by a
vendee without taking possession does not justify an equitable
suit for specific performance because the remedy at law is ade-
quate. Townsend v. Hawkins (1870) 45 Mo. 286; Blew v. Mc-
Clelland (1860) 29 Mo. 304; Wheeler v. Dake (1908) 129 Mo.
App. 547, 107 S. W. 1105. But if services are to be rendered
instead of paying money and the services are fully performed,
then the statute cannot be used to produce fraud. Jones v. Jones
(1933) 333 Mo. 478, 63 S. W. (2nd) 146; Hall v. Harris (1898)
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145 Mo. 614, 47 S. W. 506, as qualified by Russell v. Sharp (1905)
192 Mo. 270, 91 S. W. 134, 111 Am. St. Rep. 496. As to the mere
payment of money, the American Law Institute is in accord with
Missouri. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 197. As to rendering
services in lieu of paying money, apparently the American Law
Institute is at variance with Missouri. Restatement, Contracts,
Sec. 197, Illustration 5. General American law on these matters
is in a state of confusion. Williston on Contracts, Sec. 494.
Taking possession under a new oral contract plus payment of
part of purchase price will justify a suit for specific perform-
ance by either vendee or vendor even against a plea of the Statute
of Frauds. See: Green v. Ditsch (1898) 143 Mo. 1, 44 S. W. 799,
suit by vendor; Walker v. Owen (1883) 79 Mo. 563, suit by
vendor, one dollar only of purchase price having been paid; Rey-
nolds v. Reynolds (1891) 45 Mo. App. 622, suit by vendee. Mak-
ing improvements in addition to taking possession under the oral
contract is recognized as sufficient part performance. See Ross
v. Allyea (Mo. Sup. 1917) 197 S. W. 268, vendee's suit to try
title; Hubbard v. Hubbard (1897) 140 Mo. 300, 41 S. W. 749,
donee's widow enforced contract against father-in-law; Ander-
son v. Shockley (1884) 82 Mo. 250, equitable defense to eject-
ment suit; Westport Lumber Co. v. Harris (1908) 131 Mo. App.
94, 110 S. W. 609, vendees sought to avoid oral sale but not
allowed to do so. In the following cases the oral contracts were
validated by the three equitable factors of possession taken, im-
provements made, and part of purchase price paid: Congqregation
v. Arkpy (1929) 323 Mo. 776, 20 S. W. (2nd) 899, suit to quiet
title met by equitable defense; Hobbs v. Hicks (1928) 320 Mo.
954, 8 S. W. (2nd) 966, suit by vendee; Johnson v. Hurley
(1893) 115 Mo. 513, 22 S. W. 492, ejectment suit defeated by
equitable defense.
Is mere taking possession under an oral contract without pay-
ment of any money on account of price, or the making of any
improvements, sufficient to validate an oral land-sale contract?
This question has never been decided in Missouri. Strong dicta
in the affirmative have been uttered. See Ross v. Allyea (Mo.
Sup. 1917) 197 S. W. 268; Emmell v. Hayes (1890) 102 Mo.
186, 14 S. W. 209, 11 L. R. A. 323, 22 Am. St. Rep. 769; Young
v. Montgomery (1859) 28 Mo. 604; White v. Watkins (1856) 23
Mo. 423. The American Law Institute by implication answers
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this question in the negative. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 197.
A few states reject absolutely the doctrines of part perform-
ance. For a general survey of American law, see Williston on
Contracts, Sec. 494 and Page on Contracts (2nd Ed.) Sec. 1374
etff.
ORAL CONTRACTS WITHIN CLASS V
An oral contract not performable within a year, if and when
fully performed on one side, can be enforced by the performing
party without regard to the Statute of Frauds.
The exclusion of contracts that have been fully performed on
one side has been announced clearly in Missouri. "It is true that
the contract could not be wholly performed within one year; but
it was entirely and completely executed by one of the contracting
parties, and it is the established doctrine of this court, and the
settled law of this state, that where agreement not in writing
has been wholly performed on one side, the other party thereto
cannot interpose the defense of the Statute of Frauds," in a case
relating to contracts within Class V. Self v. Cordell (1870) 45
Mo. 345. To the same effect: Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Mo. Poultry
Co. (1921) 287 Mo. 400, 229 S. W. 813, plaintiff sued for goods
sold and fully delivered, but original oral contract was not to be
performed within one year; McGinnis v. McGinnis (1918) 274
Mo. 285, 202 S. W. 1087, partnership contract fully performed
on one side but original oral contract for more than one year;
Bless v. Jenkins (1895) 129 Mo. 647, 31 S. W. 938, successful
suit for rent on oral lease for fifteen months after occupany for
same period; Bird v. Bilby (1919) 202 Mo. App. 212, 215 S. W.
909, oral contract to pay plaintiff twenty dollars a month for
seventeen years if plaintiff refrained from bringing suit and
plaintiff so refrained until barred by Statute of Limitations;
Mitchell v. Branham (1904) 104 Mo. App. 480, 79 S. W. 739,
successful suit on oral contract involving defendant's promise to
refrain for three years from certain activity and consideration
fully performed by plaintiff who proved breach by defendant and
damages to plaintiff; Marks v. Davis (1897) 72 Mo. App. 557,
oral contract of employment for more than one year involving
contingent right to bonus and successful suit by employee for
bonus after contingency occurred and full performance by plain-
tiff.
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The early case of Pitcher v. Wilson (1837) 5 Mo. 46, is contra
to the holdings in the cases above referred to, but the Pitcher
Case undoubtedly has been overruled. Reigart v. Mfrs. Coal and
Coke Co. (1909) 217 Mo. 142, 117 S. W. 61, although soundly
decided, contains an inaccurate comment to the effect that the
Self case quoted from, above, was overruled by a certain case
which did not involve full performance by a plaintiff but only
partial performance.
Under this more-than-one-year provision of the Statute of
Frauds the performance to take the contract out of the statute
must be a performance in toto and not merely part performance.
See Nally v. Reading (1891) 107 Mo. 350, 17 S. W. 978, a one-
year performance of an oral four-year contract does not preclude
reliance on Statute of Frauds; Atwood's Admr. v. Fox (1860)
30 Mo. 499, a one-year performance of an oral two-year con-
tract; Diamon v. Wells (Mo. App. 1920) 226 S. W. 1016, tenant
under oral lease for more than one year having partly performed
failed in suit on the special contract when statute was invoked;
Shacklet v. Cummins (1914) 178 Mo. App. 309, 165 S. W. 1145,
successful ejectment suit in spite of oral contract for more than
one year and part performance by tenant.4
Thoroughly in accord with developed Missouri law as to con-
tracts within Class V, the American Law Institute emphasizes
the simplicity of the rule of full, but not partial, performance by
describing contracts in Class V as "bilateral contracts, so long as
they are not fully performed by either party, which are not cap-
able of performance within a year from their formation." For
general English and American law on contracts within Class V,
see Williston on Contracts, Sec. 504; Page on Contracts (2nd
Ed.) Sec. 1367.
'The apparent harshness of these holdings where a plaintiff has partially
performed under an oral contract invalid by reason of the Statute of Frauds
is mitigated by the doctrine of quantum meruit and quantum valebant. The
Statue of Frauds applies only to express contracts, and not to implied or
quasi-contracts. See Interstate Hotel Co. v. Amusement Co. (1903) 103
Mo. App. 198, 77 S. W. 114, where an express oral contract could not be
performed in less than ten years and plaintiff after partial performance
for the benefit of the defendant, being prevented from further performance
by the defendant, brought suit not on the special contract but on the contract
implied from the circumstances. Plaintiff won the suit with substantial
damages and the only point raised by the defendant was the Statute of
Frauds. See Williston on Contracts, Sec. 534.
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ORAL CONTRACTS WITHIN CLASS VI
An oral sale of chattels for the price of thirty dollars or more
is enforceable if the buyer accepts and receives all or part of the
goods, or pays all or part of the price.
This is the only class of contracts as to which there is an ex-
press statutory rule for validating an oral contract by perform-
ance. The express rule is liberal and operates either in the case
of full performance or part performance. When the statute is
satisfied by part performance in the nature of action over the
goods, there must be both acceptance and actual receipt. "It is
generally ruled that the goods are received when delivered, what
will constitute delivery will satisfy that feature of the statute.
It is also generally ruled that, in addition to what is understood
by delivery of the goods in the ordinary sense by the seller, there
must be an acceptance of them, or some part thereof, by the
buyer; but what will meet the requirements of the statute as to
acceptance has not been so well defined. Any person negotiat-
ing for the purchase of goods may, of course, inspect them at his
pleasure but it is not the inspection that binds him. It is the
acceptance of the possession and dominion over the goods as
owner under the contract that binds him." Hoffmn v. Wiscon-
sin Lumber Co. (1921) 207 Mo. App. 440, 229 S. W. 289. To the
same effect: Kirby v. Johnson (1856) 22 Mo. 354; Cunningham
v. Ashbroo, (1855) 20 Mo. 553; HIllrah-Dieckmann Ref. Co. v.
St. Louis House & Window Cleaning Co. (1914) 186 Mo. App.
207, 171 S. W. 576.
The American Law Institute is in general accord with what
has been just stated as the law of Missouri. Restatement, Con-
tracts, Secs. 201, 202. However, the American Law Institute
(following the Uniform Sales Act, now law in thirty-two states
but not in Missouri) is more liberal than Missouri in the matter
of proving what is an actual receipt of the goods. See Restate-
ment, Contracts, Sec. 202, Sub-section (1-b), and compare with
Fine v. Hornsby (1876) 2 Mo. App. 61.
As to the payment of all or part of the price, the payment may
be in money or in an agreed substitute for money, provided the
substitute for money is an absolute and not a conditional pay-
ment. In Groomer v. McMillan (1910) 143 Mo. App. 612, 128
S. W. 285, the court said: "The law is that a payment to be
effective in avoidance of the Statute of Frauds, must be an abso-
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lute payment. But it needs not be in money. The buyer's check
for money will suffice if it is received by the seller and agreed
that it is an absolut payment." The American Law Institute is
in general accord. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 205. However,
there is one important feature of variance between the law of
Missouri and the American Law Institute. As appears above in
the Groomer case, in Missouri law the payment made by check
must be an absolute and not a conditional payment. According
to the American Law Institute, a payment by a check, even if
conditional, is sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. See
Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 205, Illustration 1. The rule of the
American Law Institute, while perhaps desirable, is against the
weight of authority. See Williston on Contracts, Sec. 565.
In the following cases non-money payments were sufficient:
Ostrander v. Messmer (1926) 315 Mo. 1165, 289 S. W. 609, note
in part payment of corporate stock; Coffman v. Fleming (1923)
301 Mo. 313, 256 S. W. 731, check accepted as absolute part pay-
ment; Woodburn v. Cogdal (1866) 39 Mo. 222, note of buyer;
Alexander v. Moore (1853) 19 Mo. 143, deposit of money with
third person; Dieckman v. Young (1901) 87 Mo. App. 530, credit
on notes of seller held by buyer; Logan v. Carroll (1897) 72 Mo.
App. 613, check given, accepted and afterwards countermanded.
The statute was not satisfied in Jennings v. Dunham (1895)
60 Mo. App. 635, where seller and buyer each put up $50 as
liquidated damages in case of default, the deposit by buyer not
being a part payment of purchase price. This case also held that
"something in earnest to bind the bargain" must be a part pay-
ment. And in Groomer v. McMillan (1910) 143 Mo. App. 612,
128 S. W. 285, the court said: "Whatever may have been the
meaning of 'earnest', its statutory meaning is part payment." 5
CONCLUSIONS
So-called contracts, after full performance on both sides, are
not contracts within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds and
can never be disturbed merely because they were obnoxious to
the statute before they were fully performed on both sides.
The Statute of Frauds operates on six classes of contracts.
5 This is probably the law in other states. See Howe v. Hayward (1871)
108 Mass. 54. Historically the meaning was more magical, like the meaning
attached to a seal. See 2 Blackstone's Com. 447; Holdsworth, Hist. of Eng.
Law, vol. V, page 109.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
With reference to possible validation by full performance on one
side, or by partial performance on one side or both sides, of oral
contracts within these six classes, each one of the six classes
must be studied separately.
Class L The statute is applied literally, and full performance
by the promisee, or part performance by either promisee or
promisor, of the oral contract, will not relax the statutory rule,
so long as the contract is and continues to be a secondary con-
tract.
Class II. If the oral contract of guaranty is truly a collateral
or a secondary promise, and not a primary or original promise,
or one for the business advantage of the promisor, then perform-
ance or part performance by the promisee, or part performance
by the promisor, will not relax the Statute of Frauds.
Class 1II. Certainly in the absence of clear evidence of fraud,
the oral promise in consideration of marriage cannot be enforced
merely because the promise to marry has been fulfilled. To what
extent equity might enforce the oral contract in order to prevent
fraud is unsettled in Missouri, and is a confusing problem
throughout the country.
Class IV. Extremely liberal rules have been deevloped in equity
to prevent fraud that would result from a literal application of
the Statute of Frauds to oral land-sale contracts which have been
partly performed. The particular extent to which the liberal
rules have been developed is a problem of local jurisprudence in
each jurisdiction, and Missouri seems to be a liberal state.
Class V. Full performance, but not part performance, on one
side has the practical effect of repealing the Statute of Frauds.
Class VI. The Statute of Frauds itself in clear language sets
forth the law of performance as a method of validating an oral
chattel-sale contract.
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